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Customary	  international	  law	  is	  law	  that	  “results	  from	  a	  general	  and	  consistent	  
practice	  of	  states	  followed	  by	  them	  from	  a	  sense	  of	  legal	  obligation.”	  “International	  
agreements	  create	  law	  for	  states	  parties	  thereto	  and	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  
customary	  international	  law	  when	  such	  agreements	  are	  intended	  for	  adherence	  by	  
states	  generally	  and	  are	  in	  fact	  widely	  accepted.”	  Does	  customary	  international	  law	  
(CIL)	  exist	  in	  tax?	  There	  are	  over	  3,000	  bilateral	  tax	  treaties,	  and	  they	  are	  about	  
80%	  identical	  to	  each	  other,	  but	  do	  they	  create	  CIL	  that	  binds	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  
binding	  treaty,	  like	  for	  example	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  binds	  
the	  US,	  which	  has	  not	  ratified	  it?	  This	  chapter	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  answer	  is	  yes,	  using	  
four	  examples:	  jurisdiction	  to	  tax,	  the	  permanent	  establishment	  (PE)	  threshold,	  the	  
arm’s	  length	  standard,	  and	  non-­‐discrimination.	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Customary	  international	  law	  is	  law	  that	  “results	  from	  a	  general	  and	  consistent	  
practice	  of	  states	  followed	  by	  them	  from	  a	  sense	  of	  legal	  obligation.”2	  “International	  
agreements	  create	  law	  for	  states	  parties	  thereto	  and	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  
customary	  international	  law	  when	  such	  agreements	  are	  intended	  for	  adherence	  by	  
states	  generally	  and	  are	  in	  fact	  widely	  accepted.”3	  Does	  customary	  international	  law	  
(CIL)	  exist	  in	  tax?	  There	  are	  over	  3,000	  bilateral	  tax	  treaties,	  and	  they	  are	  about	  
80%	  identical	  to	  each	  other,4	  but	  do	  they	  create	  CIL	  that	  binds	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  
binding	  treaty,	  like	  for	  example	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  binds	  
the	  US,	  which	  has	  not	  ratified	  it?	  This	  chapter	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  answer	  is	  
sometimes	  yes,	  using	  four	  examples:	  jurisdiction	  to	  tax,	  the	  permanent	  
establishment	  (PE)	  threshold,	  the	  arm’s	  length	  standard	  (ALS)	  and	  non-­‐
discrimination.	  
	  
2. Jurisdiction	  to	  Tax.	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  widely	  accepted	  bases	  of	  jurisdiction	  to	  tax:	  residence	  and	  source,	  
which	  are	  the	  tax	  law	  equivalents	  of	  nationality	  and	  territoriality,	  the	  two	  bases	  of	  
jurisdiction	  in	  international	  law.	  For	  a	  country	  to	  have	  the	  right	  to	  tax	  income,	  that	  
income	  must	  either	  belong	  to	  a	  resident,	  since	  residents	  may	  be	  taxed	  on	  world-­‐
wide	  income,	  or	  it	  must	  have	  a	  source	  in	  the	  taxing	  country,	  since	  a	  country	  may	  tax	  
non-­‐residents	  on	  income	  sourced	  within	  it.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Internal	  Revenue	  Code	  
(IRC)	  sections	  1	  and	  11	  (imposing	  world-­‐wide	  taxation	  on	  US	  resident	  individuals	  
and	  corporations)	  and	  IRC	  sections	  2(d)	  and	  11(b)	  (limiting	  such	  taxation	  to	  US-­‐
source	  income	  for	  non-­‐resident	  individuals	  and	  corporations	  respectively).	  
	  
The	  problem	  with	  these	  limits	  on	  jurisdiction	  to	  tax	  is	  that	  a	  resident	  can	  easily	  form	  
a	  non-­‐resident	  corporation	  and	  earn	  foreign	  source	  income	  through	  that	  
corporation,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  income	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  current	  tax	  since	  it	  is	  
neither	  income	  of	  a	  resident	  nor	  from	  a	  domestic	  source.	  This	  problem	  is	  
particularly	  acute	  for	  a	  country	  like	  the	  US,	  which	  (a)	  defines	  residence	  of	  
corporations	  mechanically	  by	  reference	  to	  place	  of	  incorporation,	  (b)	  allows	  
taxpayers	  to	  choose	  which	  foreign	  entities	  are	  recognized	  as	  corporations,	  and	  	  (c)	  
generally	  respects	  the	  separate	  status	  of	  corporations	  and	  shareholders.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Rest.	  3rd	  (For.	  Rel.)	  sec.	  102(2).	  	  
3	  Rest.	  3rd	  (For.	  Rel.)	  sec.	  102(3).	  	  
4	  Ash,	  Elliott	  and	  Marian,	  Omri	  Y.,	  The	  Making	  of	  International	  Tax	  Law:	  Empirical	  
Evidence	  from	  Natural	  Language	  Processing	  (January	  11,	  2019).	  UC	  Irvine	  School	  of	  
Law	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  2019-­‐02.	  Available	  at	  
SSRN:	  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314310.	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In	  the	  1930s,	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  led	  the	  US	  to	  consider	  whether	  it	  could	  tax	  a	  foreign	  
corporation	  controlled	  by	  US	  residents	  on	  foreign	  source	  income.	  At	  the	  time,	  there	  
were	  very	  few	  tax	  treaties,	  so	  the	  jurisdictional	  limit	  was	  not	  treaty	  based	  (and	  in	  
addition,	  under	  the	  US	  Constitution	  Congress	  can	  override	  treaties).	  Nevertheless,	  
the	  US	  chose	  not	  to	  challenge	  the	  jurisdictional	  limit,	  suggesting	  that	  it	  regarded	  
itself	  bound	  by	  it	  because	  most	  countries	  practiced	  it	  out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  legal	  
obligation.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  foreign	  corporation	  was	  controlled	  by	  a	  US	  resident	  
meant	  that	  the	  US	  could	  have	  collected	  any	  tax	  imposed	  on	  the	  foreign	  corporation	  
by	  putting	  a	  lien	  on	  the	  controlling	  shareholders’	  assets,	  so	  the	  issue	  was	  not	  a	  
practical	  limit	  but	  a	  legal	  one.	  
	  
The	  context	  was	  a	  series	  of	  Congressional	  hearings	  that	  revealed	  that	  rich	  
Americans	  were	  using	  “incorporated	  pocketbooks”	  offshore	  to	  avoid	  US	  tax	  on	  their	  
income.	  For	  example,	  Jacob	  Schick,	  the	  inventor	  of	  the	  Schick	  disposable	  razor,	  
transferred	  his	  patent	  to	  it	  to	  a	  Bermuda	  corporation	  that	  accumulated	  the	  royalties;	  
Schick	  later	  proceeded	  to	  retire	  to	  Bermuda,	  gave	  up	  his	  US	  citizenship,	  and	  lived	  on	  
the	  accumulated	  tax-­‐free	  profits.	  	  
	  
To	  address	  this	  problem,	  the	  US	  adopted	  in	  1937	  a	  rule	  that	  taxed	  shareholders	  in	  
“foreign	  personal	  holding	  corporations”	  (FPHCs).	  A	  FPHC	  was	  defined	  as	  a	  foreign	  
corporation	  controlled	  (over	  50%	  by	  vote)	  by	  five	  or	  fewer	  U.S.	  resident	  individuals,	  
and	  whose	  income	  was	  over	  60%	  passive	  (since	  passive	  income	  was	  considered	  
easier	  to	  shift	  than	  active	  income).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  US	  adopted	  a	  similar	  rule	  
for	  “personal	  holding	  corporations”	  (PHCs).	  A	  PHC	  was	  defined	  identically	  to	  the	  
FPHC,	  but	  was	  a	  domestic	  corporation	  (at	  the	  time,	  like	  today,	  it	  was	  advantageous	  
for	  the	  rich	  to	  earn	  passive	  income	  through	  PHCs	  because	  the	  corporate	  rate	  was	  
about	  half	  the	  top	  individual	  rate).	  	  
	  
Why	  were	  there	  two	  different	  rules,	  one	  for	  PHCs	  and	  the	  other	  for	  FPHCs?	  The	  only	  
difference	  was	  that	  PHCs	  were	  domestic	  (resident)	  and	  FPHCs	  were	  foreign	  (non-­‐
resident).	  The	  reason	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  taxing	  mechanism:	  PHCs	  were	  taxed	  at	  the	  
corporate	  level	  at	  the	  top	  individual	  rate,	  but	  FPHCs	  were	  not	  taxed	  at	  all.	  Instead,	  
the	  US	  taxed	  the	  US	  shareholders	  on	  a	  deemed	  dividend	  of	  the	  accumulated	  passive	  
income	  of	  the	  FPHC.	  The	  reason	  was	  that	  the	  US	  considered	  it	  a	  breach	  of	  
international	  law	  to	  tax	  a	  non-­‐resident	  on	  foreign	  source	  income,	  since	  there	  was	  
neither	  residence	  nor	  source	  jurisdiction.	  And	  since	  there	  was	  no	  controlling	  treaty,	  
the	  international	  law	  involved	  had	  to	  be	  CIL.	  
	  	  
The	  deemed	  dividend	  rule	  was	  upheld	  by	  Judge	  Frank	  of	  the	  Second	  Circuit	  without	  
paying	  any	  attention	  to	  its	  international	  law	  implications.5	  And	  yet,	  it	  clearly	  
represented	  a	  major	  expansion	  of	  US	  residence	  taxing	  jurisdiction,	  since	  taxing	  a	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Eder	  v.	  Commissioner,	  138	  F.2d	  27	  (1943).	  Although,	  of	  course,	  even	  if	  he	  had	  paid	  
attention,	  he	  would	  have	  upheld	  it,	  since	  Congress	  can	  override	  CIL	  as	  well	  as	  
treaties	  by	  legislation.	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deemed	  dividend	  is	  economically	  equivalent	  to	  taxing	  a	  foreign	  corporation	  directly	  
on	  foreign	  source	  income.	  It	  could	  certainly	  be	  argued	  in	  1943	  that	  this	  rule	  was	  a	  
breach	  of	  international	  law,	  just	  like	  Judge	  Hand’s	  Alcoa	  decision	  (1945),	  which	  
invented	  the	  effects	  doctrine,	  was	  likewise	  arguably	  a	  breach	  of	  international	  law.	  	  
	  
The	  impact	  of	  the	  deemed	  dividend	  rule	  was	  greatly	  expanded	  when	  the	  Kennedy	  
administration	  decided	  in	  1961	  to	  propose	  applying	  the	  same	  rule	  to	  all	  income	  of	  
corporations	  that	  are	  over	  50%	  controlled	  by	  large	  (10%	  by	  vote	  each)	  US	  
shareholders,	  i.e.,	  to	  subsidiaries	  of	  US	  multinationals	  (CFCs).	  Ultimately,	  this	  
resulted	  in	  the	  enactment	  in	  1962	  of	  “Subpart	  F”	  which	  applied	  the	  deemed	  
dividend	  rule	  to	  certain	  types	  of	  income	  (mostly	  passive	  income)	  of	  all	  CFCs.6	  	  
Again,	  there	  was	  no	  international	  law	  challenge	  to	  the	  deemed	  dividend	  rule.	  
Instead,	  other	  countries	  began	  to	  copy	  the	  CFC	  regime:	  Germany	  (1972),	  Canada	  
(1975),	  Japan	  (1978),	  France	  (1980),	  the	  UK	  (1984)	  and	  others.	  Currently,	  there	  are	  
over	  30	  countries	  with	  CFC	  rules,	  and	  the	  number	  is	  likely	  to	  increase,	  since	  every	  
EU	  member	  state	  now	  has	  to	  have	  CFC	  rules.	  Thus,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  CFC	  
concept	  has	  arguably	  become	  part	  of	  CIL,	  just	  like	  the	  expansion	  of	  territorial	  
jurisdiction	  over	  international	  waters	  rapidly	  changed	  international	  law	  from	  the	  
1970s	  onward.	  
	  	  
Even	  more	  striking	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  the	  countries	  adopting	  the	  CFC	  rule	  
abandoned	  the	  deemed	  dividend	  idea,	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  significant	  difficulties	  in	  
practice,	  in	  favor	  of	  direct	  taxation	  of	  the	  CFC-­‐	  i.e.,	  direct	  taxation	  of	  a	  foreign	  	  	  
corporation	  on	  foreign	  source	  income	  just	  because	  it	  is	  controlled	  by	  residents.	  See,	  
e.g.,	  Sweden,	  France.	  Thus,	  the	  jurisdictional	  rule	  has	  been	  changing	  and	  no	  longer	  
seems	  to	  require	  a	  deemed	  dividend.	  Indeed,	  the	  IRS	  itself	  has	  adopted	  this	  view,	  
because	  it	  now	  believes	  that	  the	  PHC	  regime,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  older	  accumulated	  
earnings	  tax	  regime,	  both	  apply	  directly	  to	  foreign	  corporations	  even	  though	  their	  
effect	  is	  to	  tax	  the	  corporation	  on	  foreign	  source	  income.	  This	  is	  particularly	  striking	  
for	  PHCs,	  because	  it	  was	  so	  clear	  in	  1937	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  no	  jurisdiction	  to	  tax	  
foreign	  corporations	  on	  foreign	  source	  income	  that	  Congress	  did	  not	  bother	  to	  
specify	  that	  a	  PHC	  could	  not	  be	  a	  foreign	  corporation	  (while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
adopting	  the	  parallel	  FPHC	  regime	  explicitly	  for	  foreign	  corporations).	  Now	  this	  
oversight	  enables	  the	  IRS	  to	  argue	  that	  under	  the	  new	  understanding	  of	  
jurisdictional	  limits,	  the	  PHC	  rules	  apply	  to	  foreign	  corporations.	  	  
	  
Claiming	  that	  nationality	  jurisdiction	  applies	  to	  foreign	  corporations	  just	  because	  
they	  are	  controlled	  by	  nationals	  is	  a	  striking	  departure	  from	  ordinary	  international	  
law.	  Compare,	  for	  example,	  the	  oft	  recurring	  disputes	  about	  the	  extraterritorial	  
application	  of	  international	  sanctions.	  In	  both	  the	  Fruehauf	  (1965)	  and	  Sensor	  
(1982)	  cases,	  the	  foreign	  courts	  explicitly	  rejected	  U.S.	  claims	  to	  require	  foreign	  
subsidiaries	  of	  US	  multinationals	  to	  obey	  US	  sanctions	  aimed	  at	  China	  and	  the	  USSR,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  IRC	  sections	  951-­‐960.	  The	  deemed	  dividend	  rule	  is	  still	  with	  us,	  since	  it	  was	  used	  
as	  the	  basis	  of	  GILTI.	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respectively.	  In	  Sensor,	  the	  Dutch	  court	  went	  through	  all	  the	  possible	  grounds	  for	  
jurisdiction	  and	  explicitly	  found	  that	  none	  applied.	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  nationality	  
jurisdiction	  did	  not	  apply	  even	  though	  the	  subsidiary	  was	  controlled	  from	  the	  
United	  States.	  	  
	  
What,	  then,	  enables	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  countries	  to	  expand	  nationality	  
jurisdiction	  to	  subsidiaries	  in	  the	  tax	  area?	  The	  explanation	  is	  the	  “first	  bite	  at	  the	  
apple	  rule”,	  adopted	  by	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  in	  1923.	  Under	  that	  rule,	  the	  source	  
(territorial)	  jurisdiction	  has	  the	  primary	  right	  to	  tax	  income	  arising	  within	  it,	  and	  
the	  residence	  (nationality)	  jurisdiction	  is	  obligated	  to	  prevent	  double	  taxation	  by	  
granting	  an	  exemption	  or	  a	  credit.	  Thus,	  permitting	  the	  expansion	  of	  residence	  
jurisdiction	  to	  CFCs	  does	  not	  harm	  the	  right	  of	  source	  jurisdictions	  to	  tax	  them	  first;	  
residence	  (nationality)	  jurisdiction	  only	  applies	  as	  a	  residual	  matter	  when	  the	  
source	  jurisdiction	  abstains	  from	  taxing.	  This	  still	  leads	  sometimes	  to	  complaints	  by	  
source	  jurisdictions	  that	  the	  residence	  jurisdiction	  is	  taking	  away	  their	  right	  to	  
effectively	  grant	  tax	  holidays	  to	  foreign	  investors.	  	  
	  
In	  general,	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  episode	  is	  a	  good	  illustration	  of	  the	  existence	  and	  
growth	  of	  CIL	  in	  the	  tax	  area.	  In	  the	  1930-­‐1960s	  period,	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  rule	  of	  CIL	  
that	  prohibited	  taxing	  foreign	  corporations	  on	  foreign	  source	  income.	  That	  rule	  was	  
universally	  observed	  and	  was	  considered	  binding,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  US	  avoiding	  
an	  outright	  breach	  through	  the	  deemed	  dividend	  mechanism.	  However,	  once	  a	  lot	  of	  
countries	  changed	  the	  rule	  by	  taxing	  CFCs	  directly,	  the	  US	  did	  not	  consider	  it	  binding	  
any	  more,	  as	  indicated	  by	  applying	  the	  PHC	  regime	  to	  foreign	  corporations.	  	  
	  
3. The	  PE	  Threshold.	  
	  
The	  PE	  threshold	  is	  included	  in	  all	  the	  tax	  treaties:	  A	  source	  country	  may	  not	  tax	  
business	  profits	  unless	  the	  non-­‐resident	  corporation	  earning	  these	  profits	  has	  a	  PE	  
in	  the	  source	  state.	  The	  PE	  rule	  stems	  from	  19th	  century	  treaties,	  was	  included	  in	  the	  
first	  models	  drafted	  by	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  in	  the	  1920s,	  and	  is	  found	  in	  almost	  
every	  tax	  treaty	  negotiated	  since	  then.	  But	  is	  it	  CIL,	  i.e.,	  does	  it	  bind	  countries	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  a	  treaty?	  
	  
The	  core	  of	  the	  PE	  rule	  is	  the	  requirement	  of	  a	  physical	  presence,	  either	  directly	  
(e.g.,	  an	  office	  or	  a	  factory	  or	  employees)	  or	  through	  a	  dependent	  agent.	  
Interestingly,	  the	  physical	  presence	  requirement	  is	  also	  found	  in	  US	  tax	  law	  in	  non-­‐
treaty	  situations.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Piedras	  Negras	  case	  from	  1942	  (i.e.,	  long	  before	  
there	  was	  a	  treaty	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Mexico),	  a	  radio	  station	  broadcasting	  in	  
English	  from	  Mexico	  into	  Texas	  and	  deriving	  advertising	  revenue	  from	  Texas	  was	  
held	  not	  to	  have	  a	  US	  trade	  or	  business	  (the	  IRC	  equivalent	  for	  PE)	  because	  it	  had	  no	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physical	  presence	  in	  the	  US.7	  But	  this	  rule	  is	  not	  derived	  from	  CIL,	  it	  is	  a	  purely	  
domestic	  US	  requirement.	  Could	  the	  US	  abandon	  it	  without	  offending	  CIL?8	  
	  
I	  think	  the	  answer	  is	  no,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  recent	  behavior	  of	  the	  UK	  
in	  the	  digital	  economy	  context.	  The	  basic	  problem	  of	  the	  PE	  rule	  is	  that	  it	  is	  
hopelessly	  obsolete	  in	  the	  21st	  century,	  because	  multinationals	  can	  earn	  billions	  
from	  a	  taxing	  jurisdiction	  without	  having	  any	  assets,	  employees,	  or	  even	  direct	  sales	  
there	  (Facebook	  does	  not	  have	  any	  of	  these	  traditional	  items,	  it	  just	  has	  users).	  This	  
is	  why	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  consensus	  that	  the	  PE	  threshold	  must	  be	  abandoned	  in	  
favor	  of	  something	  else,	  like	  the	  EU	  proposal	  for	  a	  “substantial	  digital	  presence.”	  The	  
OECD	  has	  recently	  set	  out	  three	  options	  for	  reform	  in	  a	  consultation	  document,	  and	  
they	  all	  abandon	  the	  PE	  threshold.	  	  
	  
But	  what	  are	  countries	  to	  do	  in	  the	  meantime	  if	  they	  wish	  to	  tax	  the	  digital	  giants,	  
and	  the	  PE	  threshold	  is	  included	  in	  their	  treaties?	  The	  interesting	  answer	  comes	  
from	  the	  UK,	  the	  first	  country	  to	  adopt	  a	  “Google	  tax.”	  The	  UK	  “diverted	  profits	  tax”	  
(DPT)	  became	  effective	  on	  April	  1,	  2015	  (i.e.,	  before	  the	  OECD	  finalized	  the	  BEPS	  
project	  that	  was	  supposed	  to	  solve	  this	  problem).9	  The	  DPT	  is	  intended	  primarily	  to	  
address	  structures	  like	  Google’s	  Double	  Irish	  Dutch	  Sandwich,	  which	  is	  contained	  in	  
the	  guidance	  published	  by	  HMRC	  as	  Example	  3.	  
	  	  
Under	  Example	  3,	  the	  US	  parent	  of	  a	  multinational	  group	  (company	  A)	  owns	  a	  
subsidiary	  incorporated	  in	  Ireland	  that	  is	  treated	  under	  Irish	  law	  as	  resident	  in	  a	  tax	  
haven	  (company	  D)	  which	  owns	  the	  IP	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  Company	  D	  licenses	  
the	  IP	  to	  Company	  C	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  which	  in	  turn	  licenses	  it	  to	  Company	  B	  in	  
Ireland.	  Company	  B	  owns	  Company	  E	  which	  provides	  sales	  and	  service	  support	  in	  
the	  UK,	  with	  all	  sales	  contracts	  being	  finalized	  by	  Company	  B	  in	  Ireland.	  	  
	  
Under	  this	  structure,	  UK	  tax	  is	  only	  applied	  to	  the	  cost	  plus	  profits	  of	  company	  E,	  
which	  are	  minimal.	  Companies	  B,	  C	  and	  D	  do	  not	  have	  a	  PE	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  are	  not	  
subject	  to	  tax.	  Company	  B	  is	  taxable	  in	  Ireland,	  but	  most	  of	  its	  profits	  are	  payable	  as	  
a	  royalty	  to	  Company	  C,	  which	  it	  turn	  pays	  most	  of	  its	  profits	  to	  Company	  D	  in	  the	  
tax	  haven.	  There	  is	  no	  withholding	  tax	  on	  the	  payment	  from	  Company	  B	  to	  C	  
(because	  of	  the	  Ireland-­‐	  Netherlands	  tax	  treaty	  ans	  the	  EU	  directives)	  or	  from	  C	  to	  D	  
(because	  the	  Netherlands	  does	  not	  tax	  outbound	  royalties).	  The	  U.S.	  CFC	  rules	  (pre-­‐
TCJA)	  do	  not	  apply	  because	  other	  than	  Company	  D,	  all	  the	  other	  entities	  in	  the	  group	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  COMMISSIONER	  OF	  INTERNAL	  REV.	  v.	  PIEDRAS	  NEGRAS	  BROADCASTING	  CO.,	  127	  
F.2d	  260	  (5th	  Cir.,	  1942).	  
8	  As	  a	  constitutional	  matter	  Congress	  could	  enact	  any	  rule	  it	  wanted,	  because	  it	  can	  
override	  CIL	  just	  like	  it	  can	  override	  treaties;	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  it	  would	  be	  
overriding	  CIL	  and	  not	  just	  treaties	  if	  it	  abolished	  the	  physical	  presence	  
requirement.	  
9	  3	  FA	  2015,	  sections	  80,	  81,	  86.	  4	  HMRC,	  Diverted	  Profits	  Tax:	  Interim	  Guidance	  
(March	  2015),	  37.	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are	  disregarded	  under	  check	  the	  box,	  and	  their	  activities	  attributed	  to	  Company	  D	  
(regarded	  under	  the	  US	  rules	  as	  resident	  in	  Ireland).	  	  
	  
The	  DPT	  subjects	  this	  arrangement	  to	  UK	  tax	  because	  Company	  B’s	  affairs	  are	  
arranged	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  a	  UK	  PE.	  The	  section	  86	  charge	  will	  apply	  where	  there	  is	  a	  
non-­‐UK	  resident	  company	  (Company	  B)	  that	  is	  carrying	  on	  a	  trade;	  a	  UK	  resident	  
(Company	  E,	  the	  “avoided	  PE”)	  that	  is	  carrying	  on	  activities	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  connection	  
with	  the	  supply	  of	  goods	  or	  services	  by	  Company	  B;	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  
the	  activity	  of	  Company	  E	  or	  Company	  B	  was	  designed	  to	  avoid	  Company	  B	  being	  
subject	  to	  UK	  CIT;	  there	  is	  a	  “tax	  mismatch”	  in	  that	  the	  tax	  paid	  by	  Company	  B	  in	  
Ireland	  is	  less	  than	  80%	  of	  the	  tax	  avoided	  by	  Company	  E	  ;	  and	  tax	  reduction	  was	  
one	  of	  the	  main	  purposes	  of	  the	  arrangement.	  
	  	  
If	  these	  conditions	  are	  satisfied,	  a	  25%	  DPT	  applies	  to	  the	  diverted	  profits	  (i.e.,	  the	  
profits	  that	  would	  have	  been	  taxable	  to	  Company	  B	  in	  the	  UK	  had	  it	  had	  a	  PE),	  
measured	  initially	  as	  30%	  of	  the	  deductions	  taken	  by	  Company	  B,	  with	  later	  
adjustments	  (and	  credits	  for	  any	  foreign	  tax).	  	  
	  
The	  important	  point	  to	  realize	  is	  that	  the	  UK	  could	  have	  just	  overridden	  the	  PE	  
threshold	  and	  taxed	  Company	  B	  directly,	  because	  in	  the	  UK	  like	  other	  common	  law	  
jurisdictions	  (e.g.,	  Australia)	  treaties	  are	  not	  self	  executing:	  They	  have	  to	  be	  
implemented	  by	  an	  Act	  of	  Parliament,	  and	  that	  means	  that	  they	  can	  be	  overridden	  
by	  a	  later	  Act	  of	  Parliament.	  But	  the	  UK	  government	  clearly	  felt	  itself	  bound	  by	  the	  
PE	  threshold,	  or	  else	  it	  would	  not	  have	  devised	  such	  a	  complicated	  new	  tax	  that	  is	  
not	  subject	  to	  the	  treaties	  (because	  it	  is	  not	  an	  income	  tax)	  and	  therefore	  not	  subject	  
to	  CIL	  either	  (since	  CIL	  in	  this	  case	  stems	  from	  the	  treaties).	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  
PE	  threshold	  is	  in	  fact	  CIL.10	  
	  
4. The	  ALS.	  
	  
The	  ALS	  was	  invented	  by	  Mitchell	  Carroll	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  is	  now	  incorporated	  into	  
articles	  7	  and	  9	  of	  all	  the	  treaties.11	  It	  states	  that	  in	  establishing	  the	  profit	  allocation	  
between	  related	  parties	  (parent	  and	  subsidiary,	  or	  head	  office	  and	  branch)	  the	  
proper	  standard	  is	  to	  treat	  the	  parties	  as	  if	  they	  were	  dealing	  with	  each	  other	  at	  
arm’s	  length.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  Australia,	  which	  also	  has	  the	  power	  to	  override	  
treaties,	  chose	  to	  avoid	  the	  PE	  threshold	  by	  enacting	  in	  2015	  an	  anti-­‐avoidance	  rule	  
in	  the	  income	  tax.	  Australia	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  not	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  treaties	  
because	  it	  was	  an	  anti-­‐abuse	  measure	  (it	  amends	  Australia’s	  GAAR).	  India	  and	  other	  
countries	  enacted	  non-­‐income	  “equalization	  levies,”	  but	  that	  was	  presumably	  done	  
to	  avoid	  the	  treaties,	  not	  CIL,	  especially	  since	  some	  of	  the	  enacting	  countries	  (e.g.,	  
Spain)	  are	  civil	  law	  countries	  in	  which	  treaties	  are	  superior	  to	  domestic	  law.	  	  
11	  But	  see	  the	  1933	  League	  of	  Nations	  draft	  model	  tax	  treaty,	  which	  envisaged	  
formulary	  apportionment	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  ALS	  in	  the	  PE	  context.	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It	  has	  long	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  ALS	  is	  CIL.12	  What	  is	  hard	  to	  prove	  is	  that	  countries	  
consider	  themselves	  bound	  by	  the	  ALS	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  treaty,	  because	  the	  ALS	  is	  
the	  most	  common	  element	  in	  all	  the	  treaties.13	  But	  a	  recent	  US	  case	  is	  a	  good	  
example.	  
	  
Altera	  involved	  a	  cost	  sharing	  agreement	  between	  Altera,	  Inc.	  and	  its	  Cayman	  
Islands	  subsidiary,	  and	  the	  US	  does	  not	  have	  a	  tax	  treaty	  with	  the	  Cayman	  
Islands.	  The	  issue	  in	  Altera	  was	  whether	  the	  pool	  of	  costs	  that	  are	  covered	  by	  the	  
cost	  sharing	  agreement	  must	  include	  the	  cost	  of	  stock	  options,	  even	  though	  there	  
was	  overwhelming	  evidence	  that	  unrelated	  parties	  dealing	  at	  arm’s	  length	  would	  
not	  have	  shared	  those	  costs.	  The	  IRS	  had	  previously	  litigated	  and	  lost	  the	  same	  issue	  
in	  Xilinx,	  which	  involved	  a	  cost	  sharing	  agreement	  with	  Xilinx’s	  subsidiary	  in	  Ireland,	  
so	  that	  the	  US-­‐Ireland	  tax	  treaty	  applied.	  Thus,	  when	  confronted	  with	  Xilinx,	  
Treasury	  could	  have	  distinguished	  it	  as	  a	  treaty	  case	  and	  amended	  the	  1.482-­‐7	  cost	  
sharing	  regulation	  any	  way	  it	  wanted	  for	  non-­‐treaty	  cases.	  Specifically,	  Treasury	  
could	  have	  relied	  on	  the	  legislative	  history	  of	  the	  commensurate	  with	  income	  
standard	  of	  IRC	  482.	  Congress	  stated	  for	  a	  cost-­‐sharing	  agreement	  to	  satisfy	  the	  
commensurate	  with	  income	  requirement,	  “the	  income	  allocated	  among	  the	  parties”	  
should	  “reasonably	  reflect	  the	  actual	  economic	  activity	  undertaken	  by	  each,”	  
meaning	  that	  “the	  cost-­‐sharer	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  bear	  its	  portion	  of	  all	  research	  
and	  development	  costs.”14	  	  
	  
Moreover,	  Congress	  also	  stated	  that	  this	  result	  should	  govern	  regardless	  of	  what	  
unrelated	  parties	  would	  have	  done	  at	  arm’s	  length,	  stating	  that	  Treasury	  would	  
not	  be	  required	  to	  focus	  on	  “industry	  norms	  or	  other	  unrelated	  party	  transactions”	  
if	  they	  would	  not	  exist	  in	  a	  particular	  context	  (like	  “related	  party	  intangibles	  
transfers”).	  H.R.	  Rep.	  No.	  99-­‐426,	  at	  425	  (1985).	  Congress	  explained	  that	  such	  
transactions	  rarely	  if	  ever	  occur	  between	  unrelated	  parties:	  
	  
A	  fundamental	  problem	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  related	  
parties	  is	  different	  from	  that	  of	  unrelated	  parties….	  The	  problems	  are	  
particularly	  acute	  in	  the	  case	  of	  transfers	  of	  high-­‐profit	  potential	  intangibles….	  
Industry	  norms	  for	  transfers	  to	  unrelated	  parties	  of	  less	  profitable	  intangibles	  
frequently	  are	  not	  realistic	  comparables	  in	  these	  cases.	  Transfers	  between	  related	  
parties	  do	  not	  involve	  the	  same	  risks	  as	  transfers	  to	  unrelated	  parties.15	  
	  
Thus,	  Treasury	  could	  have	  just	  stated	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  stock	  options	  
in	  the	  cost	  sharing	  pool	  between	  related	  parties	  is	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  ALS	  because	  
there	  are	  no	  realistic	  comparables	  and	  precisely	  because	  unrelated	  parties	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Chantal	  Thomas,	  Customary	  International	  Law	  and	  State	  Taxation	  of	  Corporate	  
Income:	  The	  Case	  for	  the	  Separate	  Accounting	  Method,	  14	  BERKELEY	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  99	  
(1996).	  	  
13	  Marian	  and	  Nash,	  supra.	  
14	  H.R.	  Rep.	  No.	  99-­‐841,	  at	  II-­‐638	  (1986)	  (Conf.	  Rep.,	  emphasis	  added).	  
15	  Ibid.	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not	  have	  agreed	  to	  share	  of	  cost	  of	  stock	  options	  since	  the	  value	  of	  the	  options	  
depends	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  an	  entity	  that	  by	  definition	  they	  do	  not	  control	  (i.e.,	  
an	  unrelated	  party).	  The	  Xilinx	  outcome,	  after	  all,	  warned	  the	  Treasury	  that	  not	  to	  
address	  the	  ALS	  risks	  losing	  the	  case.	  Instead,	  Treasury	  in	  a	  non-­‐treaty	  context,	  in	  
which	  it	  was	  not	  bound	  by	  the	  ALS	  (which	  is	  for	  domestic	  law	  purposes	  only	  a	  
regulatory	  requirement,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  in	  IRC	  section	  482),	  chose	  to	  stick	  with	  the	  
ALS	  and	  risk	  the	  consequences.	  	  
	  
The	  strong	  implication	  is	  that	  Treasury	  believes	  itself	  bound	  by	  the	  ALS	  even	  when	  
there	  is	  no	  formal	  treaty-­‐based	  or	  statutory	  requirement	  to	  be	  so	  bound	  (i.e.,	  where	  
there	  is	  no	  treaty),	  and	  that	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  opinio	  juris.	  Thus,	  I	  believe	  Treasury’s	  




The	  prohibition	  against	  discrimination	  is	  included	  in	  all	  the	  tax	  treaties	  (article	  24).	  
Is	  it	  CIL?	  
	  
The	  behavior	  of	  the	  US	  in	  two	  episodes	  suggests	  that	  the	  US	  believes	  it	  is.	  The	  first	  is	  
the	  enactment	  of	  the	  original	  IRC	  section	  163(j)	  in	  1989.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  
was	  to	  limit	  the	  deductibility	  of	  interest	  paid	  to	  foreign	  related	  parties,	  but	  the	  US	  
decided	  to	  apply	  it	  to	  “tax-­‐exempt	  related	  parties”,	  even	  though	  no	  US	  tax	  exempt	  
ever	  owns	  over	  50%	  in	  the	  stock	  of	  a	  for	  profit	  corporation	  (or	  else	  it	  would	  be	  
subject	  to	  UBIT).	  The	  US	  could	  have	  made	  163(j)	  a	  treaty	  override,	  but	  its	  behavior	  
suggests	  that	  it	  was	  reluctant	  to	  flaunt	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  norm	  by	  explicitly	  
applying	  163(j)	  only	  to	  foreign	  related	  parties.	  This	  suggests	  that	  non-­‐
discrimination	  is	  CIL.	  
	  
The	  second	  is	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  BEAT	  in	  2017.	  The	  BEAT	  explicitly	  only	  applies	  
to	  foreign	  related	  parties.	  As	  a	  result	  it	  arguably	  violates	  non-­‐discrimination,	  
although	  in	  my	  opinion,	  it	  is	  not	  actually	  discriminatory	  because	  it	  also	  applies	  to	  
payments	  from	  US	  parents	  to	  CFCs.16	  Importantly,	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  in	  the	  
legislative	  history	  that	  the	  BEAT	  was	  intended	  to	  override	  treaties.	  This	  opened	  the	  
door	  to	  some	  commentators	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  BEAT	  is	  in	  fact	  subject	  to	  non-­‐
discrimination,	  and	  that	  it	  should	  not	  apply	  in	  the	  treaty	  context.17	  The	  reluctance	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Arguably,	  though,	  it	  violates	  article	  24(4),	  because	  it	  denies	  a	  deduction	  for	  
payments	  to	  a	  foreign	  related	  party	  that	  is	  fully	  deductible	  when	  paid	  to	  a	  domestic	  
related	  party.	  Still,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  formally	  the	  BEAT	  does	  not	  deny	  any	  
deductions	  (its	  an	  alternative	  minimum	  tax	  on	  a	  redefined	  tax	  base).	  	  
17	  See	  Rosenbloom,	  H.	  David	  and	  Shaheen,	  Fadi,	  The	  BEAT	  and	  the	  Treaties	  (August	  
1,	  2018).	  Tax	  Notes	  International,	  Vol.	  92,	  No.	  1,	  2018.	  Available	  at	  
SSRN:	  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229532	  or	  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3229
532;	  Wells,	  Bret	  and	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Reuven	  S.,	  The	  Beat	  and	  Treaty	  Overrides:	  A	  Brief	  
Response	  to	  Rosenbloom	  and	  Shaheen	  (August	  16,	  2018).	  U	  of	  Houston	  Law	  Center	  
Research	  Paper;	  Tax	  Notes	  International,	  October	  22,	  2018,	  p.	  383;	  U	  of	  Michigan	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the	  US	  to	  state	  that	  it	  was	  overriding	  article	  24	  suggests	  that	  it	  believes	  non-­‐
discrimination	  to	  be	  CIL.	  It	  was	  even	  suggested	  in	  the	  Congressional	  hearing	  that	  the	  
BEAT	  is	  a	  non-­‐income	  tax,	  similarly	  to	  the	  UK	  behavior	  in	  the	  DPT	  episode,	  and	  this	  
likewise	  suggests	  a	  reluctance	  to	  appear	  to	  violate	  non-­‐discrimination	  when	  there	  is	  
no	  treaty	  bar	  from	  doing	  so	  (since	  the	  treaties	  can	  be	  overridden).	  
	  	  
6. Conclusion:	  What	  Difference	  Does	  It	  Make?	  
	  
I	  believe	  that	  the	  above	  episodes	  are	  sufficient	  to	  prove	  that	  CIL	  exists	  in	  some	  cases	  
of	  tax	  law.	  But	  it	  should	  also	  be	  admitted	  that	  these	  are	  relatively	  limited	  instances.	  I	  
do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  broader	  principles	  that	  in	  my	  opinion	  underlie	  the	  
international	  tax	  regime	  (ITR),	  namely	  the	  benefits	  and	  single	  tax	  principles,	  are	  CIL,	  
because	  they	  are	  violated	  too	  frequently	  in	  practice.	  Even	  the	  prohibition	  against	  
double	  taxation	  that	  motivated	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  ITR	  is	  frequently	  violated.18	  	  
	  
Does	  the	  existence	  of	  CIL	  in	  tax	  law	  make	  a	  practical	  difference?	  After	  all,	  in	  the	  
United	  States,	  CIL	  as	  well	  as	  treaties	  can	  be	  overridden	  by	  Congress	  through	  
unilateral	  legislation,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  by	  Treasury	  through	  administrative	  action.	  
As	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  stated	  in	  1900:	  	  
	  
International	  law	  is	  part	  of	  our	  law,	  and	  must	  be	  ascertained	  and	  
administered	  by	  the	  courts	  of	  justice	  of	  appropriate	  jurisdiction	  as	  often	  as	  
questions	  of	  right	  depending	  upon	  it	  are	  duly	  presented	  for	  their	  
determination.	  For	  this	  purpose,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  treaty	  and	  no	  
controlling	  executive	  or	  legislative	  act	  or	  judicial	  decision,	  resort	  must	  
be	  had	  to	  the	  customs	  and	  usages	  of	  civilized	  nations...19	  
	  
But	  there	  are	  three	  situations	  in	  which	  CIL	  is	  nevertheless	  relevant	  as	  a	  practical	  
matter:	  In	  countries	  where	  international	  law	  is	  superior	  to	  domestic	  law,	  or	  in	  
international	  tribunals;	  in	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  no	  Federal	  law	  or	  binding	  treaty;	  and	  
in	  state	  law.	  
	  
a. Outside	  the	  US.	  
	  
Outside	  the	  US,	  international	  law	  may	  be	  treated	  as	  superior	  to	  domestic	  law.	  This	  is	  
certainly	  true	  of	  treaties	  (the	  VCLT	  explicitly	  rejects	  treaty	  overrides,	  and	  it	  is	  
generally	  binding	  directly	  or	  as	  CIL,	  since	  almost	  every	  country	  other	  than	  the	  US	  
has	  ratified	  it)	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  true	  of	  CIL.	  This	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Law	  &	  Econ	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  18-­‐019;	  U	  of	  Houston	  Law	  Center	  No.	  2018-­‐A10;	  U	  
of	  Michigan	  Public	  Law	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  617.	  Available	  at	  
SSRN:	  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3232974	  or	  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3232
974.	  
18	  See	  the	  debate	  about	  whether	  the	  human	  rights	  treaties	  are	  CIL,	  since	  they	  are	  
almost	  universally	  both	  ratified	  and	  violated	  in	  practice.	  	  
19	  The	  Paquete	  Habana,	  175	  U.S.	  677,	  700	  (1900)	  (emphasis	  added).	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multinationals	  that	  may	  in	  some	  cases	  be	  able	  to	  invoke	  CIL	  in	  international	  
tribunals.	  
	  
The	  pending	  arbitration	  between	  Vodafone	  PLC,	  the	  UK	  and	  Netherlands	  based	  
telecommunications	  giant,	  and	  the	  government	  of	  India	  is	  a	  good	  example.	  Vodafone	  
invoked	  arbitration	  proceedings	  under	  both	  the	  India-­‐U.K.	  	  and	  the	  India-­‐
Netherlands	  investment	  agreements	  to	  resolve	  its	  long-­‐running	  tax	  dispute	  with	  
India	  involving	  a	  2007	  acquisition.	  That	  dispute	  involves	  the	  tax	  treatment	  of	  capital	  
gains	  from	  the	  Vodafone	  Group’s	  2007	  acquisition	  of	  a	  majority	  stake	  in	  what	  was	  
Hutchison	  Whampoa	  Ltd.’s	  call	  center	  business,	  Hutchison	  Essar.	  Although	  the	  
transaction	  was	  effected	  by	  the	  sale	  of	  shares	  in	  a	  Caymans	  holding	  company,	  the	  
Indian	  tax	  authority	  argued	  that	  Vodafone	  was	  required	  to	  withhold	  some	  $2	  billion	  
in	  capital	  gains	  tax	  at	  source.	  However,	  Vodafone	  argued	  that	  it	  had	  no	  tax	  liability	  
on	  the	  transaction	  because	  the	  transfer	  of	  shares	  took	  place	  outside	  India.	  
The	  Indian	  Supreme	  Court	  decided	  the	  case	  in	  Vodafone’s	  favor	  in	  January	  2012,	  but	  
shortly	  after,	  in	  March,	  the	  Indian	  government	  announced	  surprise	  retroactive	  
legislative	  changes,	  explicitly	  stating	  that	  the	  term	  “transfer”	  includes	  asset	  transfers	  
undertaken	  indirectly	  through	  the	  sale	  of	  shares	  of	  legal	  entities.	  In	  the	  arbitration	  
proceedings,	  Vodafone	  has	  argued	  that	  CIL	  governs	  the	  case	  and	  that	  under	  CIL	  
there	  was	  no	  tax	  nexus	  in	  India,	  and	  that	  the	  retroactive	  tax	  amounted	  to	  an	  
expropriation.	  Since	  the	  case	  is	  in	  an	  international	  arbitration	  tribunal,	  CIL	  could	  




As	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  stated,	  CIL	  can	  be	  applied	  in	  US	  courts	  where	  there	  is	  no	  
explicit	  federal	  legislation.	  This	  is	  basically	  the	  taxpayer’s	  position	  in	  Altera,	  
although	  it	  is	  not	  arguing	  the	  case	  explicitly	  on	  CIL	  grounds,	  but	  rather	  based	  on	  the	  
Treasury’s	  refusal	  to	  state	  that	  the	  cost	  sharing	  regulations	  are	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  
ALS.	  In	  my	  opinion	  this	  argument	  is	  misguided,	  because	  Congress	  overrode	  the	  ALS	  
in	  this	  context	  when	  it	  amended	  IRC	  section	  482	  in	  1986,	  but	  the	  court	  may	  rule	  
otherwise.	  Another	  instance	  where	  US	  taxpayers	  could	  invoke	  CIL	  is	  in	  the	  
definition	  of	  US	  trade	  or	  business,	  like	  in	  the	  Piedras	  Negras	  case	  (the	  physical	  
presence	  requirement),	  because	  the	  term	  is	  not	  defined	  in	  the	  IRC.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  
to	  imagine	  a	  non-­‐discrimination	  argument	  being	  made	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  treaty	  on	  
CIL	  grounds.	  	  
	  
In	  principle	  this	  is	  a	  broad	  area	  for	  lawyers	  to	  cover,	  because	  it	  is	  definitely	  plausible	  
to	  argue	  that	  all	  the	  80%	  of	  the	  treaties	  that	  are	  identical	  constitute	  CIL	  and	  are	  
binding	  in	  the	  US	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  treaty,	  or	  at	  least	  an	  explicit	  contrary	  practice	  
in	  US	  treaties,	  legislation	  or	  regulation.	  One	  intriguing	  possibility	  is	  the	  new	  primary	  
purpose	  test	  (PPT),	  which	  under	  the	  OECD	  BEPS	  project	  and	  the	  Multilateral	  
Instrument	  (MLI)	  must	  be	  included	  in	  every	  tax	  treaty	  that	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  MLI	  
(a	  rapidly	  increasing	  number).	  The	  PPT	  states	  that	  treaty	  based	  transactions	  can	  be	  
rejected	  if	  a	  primary	  purpose	  of	  the	  transaction	  is	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  treaty.	  
This	  language	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  the	  limitation	  of	  benefits	  (LOB)	  provision	  of	  some	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US	  treaties.	  It	  will	  certainly	  be	  possible	  to	  argue	  in	  a	  few	  years	  that	  the	  PPT	  is	  CIL,	  
since	  most	  of	  the	  world	  accepts	  it,	  and	  it	  certainly	  has	  good	  US	  roots	  in	  the	  business	  
purpose/	  economic	  substance	  line	  of	  cases	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Aiken	  Industries).	  Thus,	  it	  may	  
be	  possible	  for	  the	  IRS	  one	  day	  to	  argue	  that	  a	  transaction	  that	  passes	  technical	  
muster	  under	  the	  LOB	  of	  a	  treaty	  should	  nevertheless	  be	  rejected	  under	  the	  PPT	  
even	  though	  the	  treaty	  does	  not	  contain	  the	  PPT	  language.	  Of	  course,	  the	  taxpayer	  
will	  argue	  that	  the	  LOB	  overrides	  CIL	  and	  that	  the	  US	  has	  rejected	  the	  PPT.	  It	  will	  be	  




The	  most	  obvious	  example	  of	  the	  US	  relevance	  of	  CIL	  is	  in	  state	  taxation	  cases,	  
because	  CIL	  is	  international	  law	  and	  equivalent	  to	  a	  treaty,	  and	  therefore	  applies	  
to	  and	  overrides	  contrary	  state	  law	  under	  the	  Supremacy	  Clause	  of	  the	  US	  
Constitution,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  US	  tax	  treaties	  generally	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  state	  
taxation	  (except	  for	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  provision).	  This	  is	  why	  it	  has	  been	  
argued	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  wrong	  in	  deciding	  Barclays	  against	  strong	  
evidence	  that	  the	  ALS	  was	  CIL,	  and	  that	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  was	  on	  good	  
legal	  grounds	  in	  persuading	  the	  states	  not	  to	  apply	  formulary	  apportionment	  
outside	  the	  US	  despite	  their	  victories	  in	  Container	  and	  Barclays.20	  All	  of	  the	  areas	  
of	  CIL	  mentioned	  above	  (jurisdiction,	  PE,	  and	  the	  ALS)	  could	  in	  principle	  be	  
invoked	  against	  the	  states.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Thomas,	  supra.	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